diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_auditd_pam_configuration_file_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_auditd_pam_configuration_file_modification.yml
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+name: Linux Auditd PAM Configuration File Modification
+id: 9e2b7c41-3f6a-4d58-b0e2-7a4c5d1f8b60
+version: 1
+creation_date: '2026-11-02'
+modification_date: '2026-11-02'
+author: vahid malekmohammadi
+status: production
+type: Anomaly
+description: The following analytic detects modification of the Linux PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) configuration under /etc/pam.d/ or /etc/security/, using Linux Auditd. Adversaries tamper with these files to backdoor authentication - for example adding "auth sufficient pam_permit.so" to allow any account to authenticate with no password, or wiring a pam_exec/custom module that grants access on a hardcoded password for any existing user - a stealthy persistence and defense-evasion technique (T1556.003). The analytic correlates the auditd PATH record for a PAM config file with the CWD and SYSCALL records from the same audit event, reconstructing the absolute path when the file was opened by a relative name (for example after a chdir into /etc/pam.d), requiring a successful modifying syscall, and surfacing the editing process (comm/exe) and user. Because package upgrades and pam-auth-update legitimately write these files, this is modeled as an anomaly and must be tuned with the filter macro.
+data_source:
+    - Linux Auditd Path
+    - Linux Auditd Cwd
+    - Linux Auditd Syscall
+search: |-
+    `linux_auditd`
+    (
+      (type=PATH nametype IN ("NORMAL","CREATE","DELETE"))
+      OR type=CWD
+      OR type=SYSCALL
+    )
+    | rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"
+    | stats values(name) as names values(nametype) as nametype values(cwd) as cwd_list values(comm) as process_name values(exe) as process values(success) as success values(auid) as auid values(uid) as uid values(_time) as event_times BY audit_id host
+    | eval current_working_directory=coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list,0),"N/A")
+    | eval candidate_paths=mvmap(names, if(match(names,"^/"), names, current_working_directory."/".names))
+    | eval matched_paths=mvfilter(match(candidate_paths,"^/etc/pam\.d/.+") OR match(candidate_paths,"^/etc/security/.+"))
+    | eval match_count=mvcount(matched_paths)
+    | eval reconstructed_path=mvindex(matched_paths,0)
+    | eval e_time=mvindex(event_times,0)
+    | where match_count>0 AND success="yes" AND isnotnull(process_name)
+    | rename host as dest
+    | stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime values(nametype) as nametype values(process_name) as process_name values(process) as process values(auid) as auid values(uid) as uid BY reconstructed_path current_working_directory dest audit_id
+    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+    | table firstTime lastTime dest reconstructed_path current_working_directory process_name process nametype auid uid audit_id
+    | `linux_auditd_pam_configuration_file_modification_filter`
+how_to_implement: To implement this detection, ingest auditd data consisting of SYSCALL, PATH, CWD and PROCTITLE events using the Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), and normalize the field names to the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM). Make sure the type=CWD record is captured in your auditd configuration, as it is used here to reconstruct the absolute path when a PAM file is opened by a relative name (for example after a chdir into /etc/pam.d). The host's auditd rules should generate PATH records for writes under these directories - the common way is a watch such as "-w /etc/pam.d/ -p wa -k pam" and "-w /etc/security/ -p wa -k pam" (shipped by most hardened rulesets, e.g. the Neo23x0 auditd baseline). The analytic requires a successful (success=yes) modifying syscall correlated to the PATH record, so denied/failed write attempts are not reported as modifications. Confirm field names against a real event, as auditd extraction can vary by deployment.
+known_false_positives: Package installation or upgrade of PAM-related packages (dpkg, apt, rpm) and the pam-auth-update / authselect tooling legitimately rewrite files under /etc/pam.d and /etc/security, as does configuration-management tooling (Ansible, Puppet, Chef, Salt). Update the filter macro to allowlist those processes or the service accounts that run them - for example exclude pam-auth-update and the package-manager binaries for your environment.
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003/
+    - https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor
+    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam.8.html
+    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
+drilldown_searches:
+    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
+      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
+      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
+      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+      earliest_offset: 7d
+      latest_offset: "0"
+intermediate_findings:
+    entities:
+        - field: dest
+          type: system
+          score: 72
+          message: PAM configuration file [$reconstructed_path$] was modified by process [$process_name$] on host - [$dest$], a possible authentication backdoor.
+analytic_story:
+    - Linux Living Off The Land
+    - Compromised Linux Host
+    - Linux Persistence Techniques
+asset_type: Endpoint
+mitre_attack_id:
+    - T1556.003
+product:
+    - Splunk Enterprise
+    - Splunk Enterprise Security
+    - Splunk Cloud
+category: endpoint
+security_domain: endpoint
+tests:
+    - name: True Positive Test
+      attack_data:
+        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.003/linux_auditd_pam_backdoor/linux_auditd_pam_backdoor.log
+          source: auditd
+          sourcetype: auditd
+      test_type: unit