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Security: Cadman021/VeloceNet-Studio

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Only the latest minor release line receives security fixes:

Version Supported
1.4.x ✅
< 1.4 ❌

If you are stuck on an older release, the fix will land on main — please upgrade to the latest release to receive it.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:

  1. Go to the Security tab of this repository.
  2. Click Report a vulnerability and describe the issue, ideally with:
    • affected version(s) / commit,
    • steps to reproduce or a proof of concept,
    • your assessment of impact (what can an attacker achieve?).

If private reporting is not enabled, contact the maintainer via their GitHub profile at https://github.com/Cadman021 instead of filing a public issue.

What to Expect

  • Acknowledgement of your report as soon as reasonably possible.
  • Coordinated disclosure: we will work on a fix and agree on a publication timeline with you before any public details.
  • Credit in the release notes / CHANGELOG.md if you wish.

Credential Storage Disclosure

The app stores three webhook secrets (Telegram bot token, Telegram chat ID, Discord webhook URL) so alerts keep working across restarts:

  • Windows: DPAPI-protected (current-user scope) via direct crypt32 calls — no plaintext on disk. This is the same primitive Credential Manager is built on.
  • Linux / macOS: plaintext in the app's preferences file. This is a known, accepted limitation — not an oversight. macOS Keychain and Linux libsecret backends are tracked follow-up work, tracked in the open issues. A report that merely restates this paragraph is out of scope; a working exploit that exfiltrates secrets without local user-level access is in scope.

Scope Notes

This project ships a native networking engine. Reports most valuable to us:

  • Unsafe FFI handling (invalid pointers, string lifetimes, panics crossing FFI).
  • DLL/search-path hijacking in the native library loader.
  • Input validation gaps where user input reaches sockets, processes, or FFI.
  • Secret handling flaws beyond the disclosed platform gap above.

Out of scope: reports that the app performs network probing at all (that is its documented purpose), or vulnerabilities in Flutter/Rust toolchains themselves (report those upstream).

There aren't any published security advisories