fix(security): redact temporal detector failure logs

[seonghobae]

Security/privacy defect

Protected develop@acdbea6344fe1231c39535b575f4de35e4c607c9 used raw exception logging in the public safe-failure wrappers for groove, stop-time, and shared-hit detection. Those routines intentionally swallow third-party failures, but logger.exception(...) serialized dependency-controlled exception messages and traceback paths into routine logs, conflicting with the redacted-by-default diagnostic contract in docs/security/app-security.md.

Exact current identity

• Protected base: develop@acdbea6344fe1231c39535b575f4de35e4c607c9.
• Exact head: 396d42017bd32c9b7215ec8bf8f5bf8669139e85.
• PR merge checkout observed by exact-head workflows: 470a9808b5f1ee6d8881ffbf9a6d0d236275c92a.
• Branch: fix/temporal-detector-log-privacy.
• Open, Draft, mergeable, unmerged.

Test-first repair

RED regressions were committed before production changes:

• 9224fc2925297018f892f5d2d770a6f9411f818e injects /Users/Alice/private-groove.wav token=super-secret through groove onset detection and requires the established neutral result plus a payload-free routine diagnostic.
• 414ceb36d9fbfb9af580ae29c4685caa40b39a67 adds the same realistic sensitive shapes through stop-time and shared-hit wrapper failures and requires empty safe results without local username/path/file/secret leakage.

The current head is a direct three-commit descendant of that RED boundary. Exact-current-source inspection verifies the intended GREEN behavior:

• detect_groove() catches unexpected failures, returns the unchanged neutral groove result, and logs only the BandScope-owned operation text plus type(error).__name__;
• detect_stop_time() returns [] and logs only the operation plus exception class;
• detect_shared_hits() returns [] and logs only the operation plus exception class;
• the committed privacy regressions remain present and continue to reject the injected path, filename, and secret payloads; and
• module security documentation plus CHANGELOG.md describe the same executable boundary.

No groove classification, onset analysis, stop-time/shared-hit mathematics, public result schema, dependency, lockfile, model, filesystem/network/IPC authority, workflow, credential, or vulnerability-suppression behavior changed.

Exact-current-head verification

Repository workflows on unchanged exact head 396d42017bd32c9b7215ec8bf8f5bf8669139e85 are terminal:

• terminal-success: ci run 32318440119, release 32318440098, build-baseline 32318440123, sbom 32318440090, SAST Semgrep 32318440107, bandit 32318440101, and secret-scan-gate 32318440147;
• terminal-failure/non-passing: security-audit 32318440094 and aggregate Security Scan 32318440082.

The two failures were inspected at exact job/log level rather than inferred from predecessor evidence.

security-audit job 96275581581 checks out merge 470a9808..., completes setup and npm ci, then fails first at npm audit --workspaces --audit-level=high on the protected-base JavaScript set nanoid <3.3.18, pdfjs-dist >=5.6.83 <6.2.108, and undici 7.0.0-7.28.0. Python and Rust audit stages are skipped after that npm failure and are not counted as success.

Aggregate Security Scan has terminal-success Dependency Review, OSV base-vs-head comparison, and Scorecard. Its only failed substantive job is Trivy 96275584568; the scan/SARIF generation succeeds, then the finding gate reports exactly one HIGH whole-tree finding: CVE-2026-16633 for pdfjs-dist at package-lock.json:6370, and explicitly directs remediation to the shared base.

This PR changes no JavaScript dependency/root lock or suppression policy, so those failures remain canonical #783-owned protected-base evidence. They are neither suppressed nor duplicated here.

Current formal reviews: none. Current inline review threads: zero. CodeRabbit skipped automated review because the PR is Draft; skipped review is non-passing and there is no qualifying independent non-author exact-head approval.

Security Notes

Unexpected third-party/numeric failures while temporal detectors process untrusted decoded audio and beat/stem evidence are untrusted diagnostic input. The repaired wrappers retain stable recoverable results and bounded exception-class classification for operators while preventing raw exception messages and traceback payloads from becoming routine logs. Independent native/dependency logging sinks remain separately governed.

Merge gate

Keep Draft and unmerged until one unchanged resulting exact head has every applicable repository and central CI/security/SAST/SBOM/supply-chain/coverage/review gate terminal-success, exact required owned statement/branch coverage and public docs, canonical dependency prerequisites integrated and revalidated, zero valid unresolved findings, a qualifying independent non-author last-push approval, and ordinary protected-branch acceptance without bypass.

Queued, pending, skipped-required, cancelled, failed, predecessor-head, protected-base, model-only, self/author, rate-limited, or administrative-bypass evidence is non-passing.

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