[Security] fix pull_request_target workflow injection (pwn request)#3115
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dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
[Security] fix pull_request_target workflow injection (pwn request)#3115dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 1 commit into
dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 1 commit into
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Switch fork-checkout CI workflows from pull_request_target to pull_request so untrusted fork code no longer runs with secrets and a writable token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security: fix
pull_request_targetpwn-request vulnerabilityThe CI workflows below trigger on
pull_request_targetand check out the PR head from the fork (ref: …head.sha,repository: …head.repo.full_name). That runs untrusted fork code in the trusted base-repo context — with access to repository secrets (PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY,PIMCORE_INSTANCE_IDENTIFIER,PIMCORE_SECRET) and a writableGITHUB_TOKEN. This is the classic "pwn request" pattern;actions/checkout@v6now hard-blocks it.Fix
Switch these workflows from
pull_request_targettopull_request. Fork PRs then run in the fork's restricted context: no secrets, read-only token. The same code still runs, but there is nothing sensitive to steal and nothing to push — the trust boundary is respected.Trade-off: fork PRs no longer receive the Pimcore secrets. Same-repo branches/PRs and
pushkeep them. Ifpimcore-installrequires the product key, external fork PRs may fail at install and need a key-less test install path.cla-check.ymlintentionally keepspull_request_target— it only reads PR metadata / comments and never checks out fork code, which is the safe use of that trigger.Affected files (this branch):
behat.yml,behat_ui.yml,license-check.yaml,packages_bundles.yml,packages_components.yml,static.yml.🤖 Generated with Claude Code