[Security] fix pull_request_target workflow injection (pwn request)#3116
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dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 3 commits into
Open
[Security] fix pull_request_target workflow injection (pwn request)#3116dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 3 commits into
dpfaffenbauer wants to merge 3 commits into
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Switch fork-checkout CI workflows from pull_request_target to pull_request so untrusted fork code no longer runs with secrets and a writable token. Restrict frontend-build (auto-commit, write token) to same-repo branches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security: fix
pull_request_targetpwn-request vulnerabilityCI workflows here trigger on
pull_request_targetwhile checking out the PR head from the fork (ref: …head.sha,repository: …head.repo.full_name). That runs untrusted fork code in the trusted base-repo context — with repository secrets (PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY,PIMCORE_INSTANCE_IDENTIFIER,PIMCORE_SECRET) and a writableGITHUB_TOKEN. Classic "pwn request";actions/checkout@v6now hard-blocks it (see failing job on #3113).Fix
Switch these workflows from
pull_request_targettopull_request, so fork PRs run in the fork's restricted context (no secrets, read-only token).frontend-build.yamladditionally gets anifguard so it only runs for same-repo branches — it auto-commits built assets with a writable token, which a fork PR can't do underpull_requestanyway.cla-check.ymlintentionally keepspull_request_target(reads PR metadata only, no fork checkout).Trade-off: fork PRs no longer receive Pimcore secrets. Same-repo branches/PRs and
pushkeep them.Affected files:
behat.yml,behat_ui.yml,license-check.yaml,packages_bundles.yml,packages_components.yml,static.yml,frontend-build.yaml.🤖 Generated with Claude Code