chore(deps): update actions/checkout action to v7#33
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Missing tracking ID violates the 'Link an issue or ticket reference' requirement for pull request descriptions. Add a reference such as 'Refs: ABC-123' to the description to ensure compliance with project traceability guidelines. |
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Security risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml arises from pull_request_target granting untrusted fork code access to repository secrets and elevated permissions. Remove the trigger or migrate to pull_request to prevent unauthorized secret exposure.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
# remove pull_request_target unless you intentionally need base-repo context with secretsPrompt for LLM
File .github/workflows/ci.yml:
Line 19:
WHAT: The workflow includes pull_request_target trigger which runs in the base repository context and can expose secrets if a forked PR is checked out and untrusted code is executed. WHY: pull_request_target grants the workflow access to repository secrets and elevated permissions; although upgrading to actions/checkout@v7 appears to block checking out fork refs (reducing this risk), the presence of pull_request_target still requires deliberate validation. HOW: Validate whether pull_request_target is required; if not, prefer pull_request for running untrusted-code steps, or explicitly avoid running steps that use secrets when handling forked PRs.
Suggested Code:
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
# remove pull_request_target unless you intentionally need base-repo context with secrets
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| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2 | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 |
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Credential exposure risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/checkout@v7 can persist credentials to subsequent workflow steps in PRs, allowing GITHUB_TOKEN to be available to untrusted code. Disable credential persistence by adding with: persist-credentials: false to prevent exposing tokens to PR workflows.
checkout: actions/checkout@v7
with:
persist-credentials: falsePrompt for LLM
File .github/workflows/ci.yml:
Line 22:
Credential exposure risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/checkout@v7 can persist credentials to subsequent workflow steps in PRs, allowing GITHUB_TOKEN to be available to untrusted code. Disable credential persistence by adding with: persist-credentials: false to prevent exposing tokens to PR workflows.
Suggested Code:
checkout: actions/checkout@v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
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| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2 | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 |
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Fetch-depth/LFS behavior risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml when upgrading to actions/checkout@v7: changes to default fetch-depth or Git LFS handling can omit tags, earlier commits, or LFS-managed files and break CI steps that rely on repository history or LFS artifacts. Explicitly set with: fetch-depth: 1 and monitor LFS behavior to preserve expected shallow-clone semantics and detect any v7-related LFS regressions.
checkout: actions/checkout@v7
with:
fetch-depth: 1Prompt for LLM
File .github/workflows/ci.yml:
Line 22:
Fetch-depth/LFS behavior risk in .github/workflows/ci.yml when upgrading to actions/checkout@v7: changes to default fetch-depth or Git LFS handling can omit tags, earlier commits, or LFS-managed files and break CI steps that rely on repository history or LFS artifacts. Explicitly set with: fetch-depth: 1 and monitor LFS behavior to preserve expected shallow-clone semantics and detect any v7-related LFS regressions.
Suggested Code:
checkout: actions/checkout@v7
with:
fetch-depth: 1
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This PR contains the following updates:
v6.0.2→v7.0.1Release Notes
actions/checkout (actions/checkout)
v7.0.1Compare Source
v7.0.0Compare Source
v7Compare Source
v6.1.0Compare Source
v6.0.3Compare Source
Configuration
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