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Built-in Slack MCP integration requests full scope superset even when only read tools are exposed #4935

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Description

@rradillen

Describe the bug

When authenticating the built-in Slack MCP server ( mcp.slack.com ) via Copilot CLI, the generated OAuth consent URL requests the full superset of Slack scopes — including write scopes ( chat:write ,  files:write ,  channels:write ,  canvases:write ,  lists:write ,  reactions:write ,  im:write ,  mpim:write ,  groups:write ) — even though the session only exposes a small set of read-only tools:

•  slack_read_channel 
•  slack_read_thread 
•  slack_list_channel_members 
•  slack_search_public 

Example generated authorize URL (redacted):

https://slack.com/oauth/v2_user/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=REDACTED&state=REDACTED&code_challenge=REDACTED&code_challenge_method=S256&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A58672%2F&scope=canvases%3Aread+canvases%3Awrite+channels%3Ahistory+channels%3Aread+channels%3Awrite+chat%3Awrite+emoji%3Aread+files%3Aread+files%3Awrite+groups%3Ahistory+groups%3Aread+groups%3Awrite+im%3Ahistory+im%3Aread+im%3Awrite+lists%3Aread+lists%3Awrite+mpim%3Ahistory+mpim%3Aread+mpim%3Awrite+reactions%3Aread+reactions%3Awrite+search%3Aread.files+search%3Aread.im+search%3Aread.mpim+search%3Aread.private+search%3Aread.public+search%3Aread.users+users%3Aread+users%3Aread.email&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmcp.slack.com%2F&prompt=select_account

Expected behavior

Actual behavior
Users are asked to grant far broader permissions (including message sending, file uploads, channel creation, list/canvas writes) than the tool set they can actually use, violating least-privilege expectations.

Suggested fix

• Scope the OAuth request dynamically to the active/allowed tool set, or
• Provide a config option (e.g. in  mcp-config.json ) to restrict which scopes are requested for the built-in Slack MCP connection.

Affected version

1.0.87-0

Steps to reproduce the behavior

  1. Ensure the built-in Slack MCP server ( mcp.slack.com ) is available in Copilot CLI (no custom config needed — it's a first-party integration).
  2. In an interactive Copilot CLI session, run  /mcp  (or trigger any Slack-related request) so Copilot needs to authenticate with Slack.
  3. Confirm only a subset of read tools are currently exposed for the session, e.g.  slack_read_channel ,  slack_read_thread ,  slack_list_channel_members ,  slack_search_public  (visible via the tool list /  <tools_changed_notice>  or  /mcp  output).
  4. Trigger the OAuth flow (Copilot opens/prints an authorization URL and starts a local loopback listener, e.g.  http://127.0.0.1:PORT/ ).
  5. Inspect the generated  https://slack.com/oauth/v2_user/authorize?...  URL's  scope=  query parameter.
  6. Observe: the  scope  parameter includes the full superset of Slack scopes — including write scopes ( chat:write ,  files:write ,  channels:write ,  canvases:write ,  lists:write ,  reactions:write ,  im:write ,  mpim:write ,  groups:write ) and additional read scopes ( users:read ,  users:read.email ,  emoji:read ,  search:read.private/mpim/im/files/users ) — none of which are required by the 4 tools actually exposed.

Expected behavior

The requested  scope  list should match only the tools actually enabled/exposed for the current session (or at minimum, be configurable), rather than always requesting the full write+read superset.

Activity

  1. added theissue type on Sep 22, 2026
  2. nberger1 commented on Sep 30, 2026

    @nberger1

    Confirmed on 1.0.89. Adding what happens after the consent screen.

    Test setup: throwaway free workspace, internal app configured with six read-only user scopes (search:read, channels:read, groups:read, im:read, mpim:read, users:read).

    Requesting the full scopes_supported superset against oauth/v2_user/authorize:

    • Slack granted all 31 scopes, including the 9 writes. No invalid_scope, no narrowing to the app's configured scopes.
    • A later authorization requesting only 3 scopes returned the same 31. Slack's OAuth is additive ("Appending scopes" in their docs) and scopes can't be downgraded without revoking.
    • The scope set survives token refresh.
    • chat.postMessage with that token succeeded.

    So an app configured read-only ends up with a token that can post as the user, permanently.

    Restricting scopes on the Slack app doesn't prevent this. The tools allowlist in mcp-config.json is the only available lever and it has no effect on requested scopes.

    Context for the size of the superset: tools/list on mcp.slack.com returns 27 tools, 13 of them writes (slack_send_message, slack_schedule_message, slack_create_conversation, slack_get_file_upload_url, slack_update_canvas, ...). The scopes match the server's full surface rather than the tools exposed to the session.

    Deriving the scope list from the enabled tool set would fix it.

    Triage note: the report describes mcp.slack.com as a first-party built-in. On my install it isn't. No slack string in the bundles for 1.0.85-1.0.89, and I had to add it manually with a static oauthClientId. May be version or plan dependent.

  3. added
    area:mcpMCP server configuration, discovery, connectivity, OAuth, policy, and registry
    and removed on Oct 26, 2026
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