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chore: update cppcheck.yml workflow configuration #351

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BLumia merged 1 commit into from
Oct 21, 2026
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chore: update cppcheck.yml workflow configuration #351

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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion .github/workflows/cppcheck.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,10 +14,11 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: export
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
persist-credentials: false
allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true

@sourcery-ai sourcery-ai Bot Oct 21, 2026

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🔴 Critical · Untrusted PR code enters privileged job

When an attacker-controlled PR head is checked out and its content reaches an unsafe execution or interpretation path in the scanner, a malicious PR can supply the checked-out workspace to linuxdeepin/action-cppcheck@main, which also receives GITHUB_TOKEN; if crafted input is executed or interpreted unsafely by the analysis step, the token is exposed or abused. The caller sees a compromised token-bearing workflow run.

Avoid checking out untrusted PR code in a pull_request_target job that receives a token; run analysis in an unprivileged pull_request workflow or isolate it and restrict token permissions.

Prompt for AI agents 
In `.github/workflows/cppcheck.yml` at line 21:

**Untrusted PR code enters privileged job**

When an attacker-controlled PR head is checked out and its content reaches an unsafe execution or interpretation path in the scanner, a malicious PR can supply the checked-out workspace to `linuxdeepin/action-cppcheck@main`, which also receives `GITHUB_TOKEN`; if crafted input is executed or interpreted unsafely by the analysis step, the token is exposed or abused. The caller sees a compromised token-bearing workflow run.

Avoid checking out untrusted PR code in a `pull_request_target` job that receives a token; run analysis in an unprivileged `pull_request` workflow or isolate it and restrict token permissions.

- uses: linuxdeepin/action-cppcheck@main
with:
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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