Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please email admin@qector.store with:

1. A description of the vulnerability
2. Steps to reproduce (or a proof-of-concept)
3. The affected version(s)
4. Any suggested fix, if you have one

• We follow coordinated disclosure: the vulnerability is kept private until a fix is available.
• Once a fix is released, we will publish a security advisory on the GitHub repository.
• Credit will be given to the reporter unless they request anonymity.
• We will not take legal action against researchers who report vulnerabilities in good faith.

The following are in scope:

• The QECTOR Decoder Workbench application (GUI, CLI, MCP server)
• The qector-decoder-v3 backend library
• Export/import file handling and path traversal
• License key storage and validation
• The MCP JSON-RPC transport layer

The following are out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report to the upstream project)
• Denial-of-service attacks requiring local access
• Social engineering attacks

The QECTOR Decoder Workbench implements:

• Path traversal protection: All export paths are sanitized via utils.sanitize_export_path(), rejecting .. components and absolute paths outside the export directory.
• License key encryption: License keys stored at ~/.qector/license.key are encrypted using Fernet with a machine-derived key, preventing plaintext exposure.
• Zero-egress attestation (v1.0.1): An AST scan of the shipped Python surface (compliance.scan_python_surface) attests that no unguarded network or telemetry imports ship in the app; compliance.compliance_report() produces a machine-readable attestation for infosec review.
• EgressGuard (v1.0.1): In air-gap mode (QECTOR_AIRGAP / QECTOR_OFFLINE, or any frozen bundle) a runtime guard blocks DNS resolution and connections to non-loopback hosts, raises EgressBlockedError, and logs every attempt with a stack trace to logs/egress.log. Loopback stays allowed for local services such as qector serve.
• Optional Entra ID sign-in (v1.0.1): Off by default; zero-egress by default (msal is imported lazily, only inside login()). Hard-disabled whenever air-gap mode is active. Token cache and configuration are encrypted at rest with the machine-derived Fernet key.
• Input length limits: Profile fields, file paths, and decoder parameters are bounded to prevent resource exhaustion.
• No eval/exec: The codebase contains no eval() or exec() calls on user input.
• HTML escaping: All user-provided content is escaped before interpolation into HTML reports.
• File permissions: License key files are written with mode 0o600 where the OS supports it.

Security inquiries: admin@qector.store