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fix(auth): replace login lockout with account step-up (audit P1-1) - #63
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…s out Audit P1-1. /v1/auth/login charged a per-handle bucket on every attempt before checking the password, so anyone could exhaust a victim's handle with wrong guesses from one address and lock the owner out indefinitely. /v1/auth/webauthn/login/options had the same shape for challenge requests. Password login: - per-IP bucket still charges every attempt, before credential work - failed attempts count against two failure budgets keyed by the submitted handle: per (handle, source address), 5/15min, and account-wide, 50/15min - both are reserved in the same atomic admission, so concurrent guesses cannot overshoot, and refunded when the password is correct, so success spends no failure budget - unknown and real handles share identical buckets and responses WebAuthn login options: per IP only. A per-handle bucket there counted requests anyone can make and guarded nothing: challenges are random, single-use and keyed by their own hash, and signatures cannot be guessed. RateLimiter gains refund(). PgRateLimiter runs it in the same sorted-key, lock- and statement-bounded transaction as multi-bucket admission, using SELECT ... FOR UPDATE then decrement or delete (CHECK request_count > 0). The route logs a refund fault rather than failing a login whose session already exists; an unrefunded slot stays charged, which fails closed.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughPassword login now tracks IP, per-handle-and-source-IP, and cross-address failure limits. When the cross-address limit is exhausted, password-only sign-in requires a passkey or an emailed code. Registration requires an email, and password sign-in requires email verification. WebAuthn login-options requests use an IP-only limit. ChangesPassword login and step-up
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to Legacy users without an email cannot regain password access after their session expires. Provide a verified recovery path before merging. The token-table migration also needs a lock-safe validation plan for populated deployments. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The change removes the account-wide lockout mechanism, but signing in after repeated failures now depends on email delivery. If a code cannot be delivered, recovery can be delayed even after the delivery failure is known. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
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PR Summary by QodoPrevent handle-targeted login throttle lockouts
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Review of PR #63 (Qodo, Greptile): - A refund was keyed by bucket name only, so a login admitted just before its window ended could hand a slot back to the next window, which other requests had charged. Admission now returns a reservation (key + window identity) for each bucket marked `refundable`, and refund() acts only while that same window is current and live. PostgreSQL identifies a window by its start in whole microseconds. - PgRateLimiter.refund judged liveness with now(), which is fixed at transaction start, so a refund that waited on the row lock past the window's end still saw it as live. It now uses clock_timestamp(), and the writes repeat the check. - Refund faults are logged through the request-scoped ctx.logger with the stack, so they correlate with the login; RouteDeps no longer carries a root logger. Tests: window-rollover refunds (in-memory and PostgreSQL), reservations only for refundable buckets and never for the IP bucket across replicas, and a structural check that login refunds exactly what reserve() returned.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit 40517c2 |
Review of PR #63 (Qodo): a reservation named only its bucket and window, so refunding it a second time would take back a charge that a later request had made in the same window. Each limiter now tracks the reservations it issued in a WeakSet, and refund() consumes each at most once (WeakSet.delete checks and consumes). A replayed reservation, or a structurally equal object the limiter never issued, refunds nothing. Reservations never leave the request that made them, so in-process tracking suffices and no schema change is needed. PgRateLimiter consumes before its transaction, so a refund that faults stays charged, which fails closed. Tests: Qodo's replay sequence (A and B admitted, refund A, admit C, replay A) plus a forged reservation, in memory and on PostgreSQL. The cross-replica test now refunds on the issuing replica and shows the freed slot on the other.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit d374e6b |
Review of PR #63 (Greptile): since reservations became single-use per issuing limiter, the concurrent-refunds test issued every reservation through one instance but refunded two through the other, so those two refunds were skipped and the race covered one instance only. Each reservation is now issued by the instance that refunds it, and the test asserts the exact outcome: all five refunds ran, so the stored count equals the racing admissions that succeeded. Restoring the cross-instance refunds fails it.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit c832456 |
…e owner Owner review of PR #63: the account-wide per-handle cap (50 failures per 15 minutes) was still a victim-targetable hard lockout. Ten source addresses could fill it and refuse the owner's correct password from a clean address for the rest of the window. P1-1's acceptance is that a third party cannot lock an account out. Login now admits against: - login:ip every attempt, before credential work (unchanged) - login:handle-ip failures per handle and source address, 5 per 15 min, reserved at admission and refunded on success There is no account-wide pre-authentication bucket. Guessing spread over many independent addresses is therefore limited per address, not globally; bounding it without a lockout lever needs a separate proof (challenge), which is future work. The reserve/refund machinery stays, and nothing in it is now unused. The handle-and-source bucket still needs it so success costs no failure budget and concurrent failures cannot overshoot. Tests: 25 sources each exhaust their budget against one handle and the owner still logs in from a clean source (fails on the previous head at the 11th source). Concurrent failures from one source admit exactly the budget, in memory and across two PostgreSQL replicas. Other tests are rewritten to the per-source policy.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit b644090 |
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit d4048b7 |
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/api/src/auth/service.ts`:
- Around line 317-321: Add a recovery or enrollment flow for legacy password
accounts with no email, accessible after their session expires, that
independently verifies email ownership before setting the address. Update the
relevant AuthService.login flow so these users have a path to regain access
without treating an email backfill or an authenticated-session-only update flow
as proof of ownership.
In `@packages/api/test/login-step-up.integration.test.ts`:
- Around line 240-249: Update the `finally` cleanup for `replicas` so a failure
from `closeServer` or `replica.shutdown()` does not skip remaining teardown
steps or environment restoration. Record teardown failures, attempt both steps
for every replica, restore the saved environment, then propagate a recorded
failure.
In `@packages/persistence/migrations/0037_login_step_up.sql`:
- Around line 7-9: Add the identity_tokens_kind_check constraint as NOT VALID in
this migration, then validate it in a separate later migration after the
existing migrations so validation runs in a separate transaction.
In `@packages/web/src/app/auth-controller.ts`:
- Line 238: Reset step-up state by invoking onStepUp(false) after successful
passkey verification in loginWithPasskey and when clearing the session in
clearControllerSession; preserve the existing session-adoption and
session-change flows.
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📒 Files selected for processing (67)
docs/FEATURE_PARITY_AUDIT.mddocs/PROJECT_STATE.mddocs/adr/0145-login-step-up.mdpackages/api/openapi.jsonpackages/api/src/auth/service.tspackages/api/src/config.tspackages/api/src/email/content.tspackages/api/src/email/resend-email-sender.tspackages/api/src/fakes.tspackages/api/src/openapi/schemas.tspackages/api/src/openapi/types.tspackages/api/src/ports/email.tspackages/api/src/ports/in-memory-rate-limiter.tspackages/api/src/ports/pg-rate-limiter.tspackages/api/src/ports/rate-limiter.tspackages/api/src/routes.tspackages/api/src/server.tspackages/api/test/auth-signin-schema.integration.test.tspackages/api/test/auth.test.tspackages/api/test/bot-game-route.test.tspackages/api/test/cookie-auth.test.tspackages/api/test/helpers.tspackages/api/test/login-lockout.test.tspackages/api/test/login-step-up.integration.test.tspackages/api/test/login-step-up.test.tspackages/api/test/openapi-nullability.test.tspackages/api/test/pg-security.integration.test.tspackages/api/test/rate-limit-atomicity.test.tspackages/api/test/rate-limit-spoofing.test.tspackages/api/test/rate-limit-structure.test.tspackages/api/test/rate-limit.test.tspackages/api/test/recovery.test.tspackages/api/test/resources.test.tspackages/api/test/router.test.tspackages/api/test/webauthn.test.tspackages/e2e-harness/src/harness.tspackages/e2e-harness/test/protocol.test.tspackages/persistence/migrations/0037_login_step_up.sqlpackages/persistence/migrations/0038_login_step_up_index.sqlpackages/persistence/src/pg/repositories.tspackages/persistence/src/repositories.tspackages/web/e2e/account-security-sessions.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/achievements.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/analysis.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/auth-responsive.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/email-verification.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/forum.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-actions.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-keyboard.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-lifecycle.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-presence.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-responsive.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-vs-bot.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/game-vs-human.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/learning.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/messages.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/play-vs-computer.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/search.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/seek-acceptance.spec.tspackages/web/e2e/teams.spec.tspackages/web/index.htmlpackages/web/src/api/models.tspackages/web/src/app/auth-controller.tspackages/web/src/app/bootstrap.tspackages/web/test/api-client.test.tspackages/web/test/auth-controller.test.tspackages/web/test/bootstrap.test.ts
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…d load scripts Registration now requires an email (ADR-0145). CI's real-Nginx trusted-edge acceptance failed with 422 because these callers, outside packages/, still registered without one. None of them signs in with the password afterwards, so an address on the reserved .test domain is all they need.
…ered codes Review of d4048b7 (Qodo, Greptile): - In step-up, a correct password on an unverified account gets only the uniform step_up_required answer; answering email_unverified there would tell a guesser the password was right. The owner's way back is a new session-less endpoint, POST /v1/auth/email/verification/resend: always 202, sends only to an existing unverified address, the same 10-minute per-account cooldown, and a per-IP limit only (a per-handle bucket would let anyone stop the owner's new link). The web sign-in form gains a "Resend verification email" control that uses the handle field. - Email stays fire-and-forget so timing never depends on whether a code was sent. When the provider reports a code undelivered, the code is now discarded in the background, so the owner's next attempt issues a fresh one instead of waiting out the 10-minute lifetime. - ADR-0145 records the no-email pre-launch accounts the owner chose not to migrate (no production users). Tests: an unverified owner in step-up re-sends, verifies and signs in with a code; the re-send answers identically for unknown, verified and pending handles and honours its cooldown; an undelivered code no longer blocks the next one. Each has a mutant that the suite catches.
Review of b98febb: - Greptile: the session-less re-send superseded the owner's outstanding verification link, so anyone who knew the handle could keep invalidating it every ten minutes. A cooldown-limited re-send (public route, or the one a sign-in attempt triggers) now adds a link and leaves earlier ones valid for their 24 hours. The authenticated re-send still supersedes. - CodeRabbit: step-up state survived passkey sign-in and logout, so a stale code field could reappear. The controller now withdraws step-up whenever it adopts or clears a session, which covers every path. - CodeRabbit: the replica integration test now runs every teardown step even when an earlier one fails, as the sibling integration test does. Tests: an earlier link still verifies after a re-send (in memory and PostgreSQL), session changes withdraw step-up, and a new mutant for the superseding behaviour is caught.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit 0dbc48f |
Review of 0dbc48f (Qodo): - The public re-send did extra awaited storage work only for an existing unverified account, so response latency could reveal which handles were pending. The route now answers 202 before any lookup and runs the whole re-send in the background; failures are logged. - A verification link the provider reports undelivered is now discarded in the background, as undelivered sign-in codes already were, so it no longer counts toward the 10-minute re-send cooldown. - Failing to discard an undelivered token was swallowed silently, leaving the owner blocked with nothing to explain it. It is now logged with the purpose and error only; AuthService receives the server's logger. Tests: the re-send answers even when the lookup never completes, a failed verification email does not hold up the next one, and a failed clean-up is logged without identifying data. Each has a mutant that is caught.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit b303baa |
…down Review of b303baa: - Greptile: a provider timeout or unreadable answer does not prove the email was not delivered, yet it discarded the token, which could void a link or code the owner had received. Tokens are now discarded only when the provider definitively refused the message (rejected or throttled); on an ambiguous outcome the token stays valid. - Qodo: accepted background work (the session-less re-send and email follow-ups) could be cut off by graceful shutdown closing the pool. AuthService now tracks it, and serve.ts drains it with a bound after the HTTP server closes and before the pool ends. - Qodo: background failures are now logged with the request and trace ids and the stack, still without address, user, token or code. Tests: a timed-out code stays valid and is not replaced, a refused one is replaced, drain waits for a pending re-send, and the clean-up failure log carries correlation and stack. New mutants for ambiguous discard and a non-waiting drain are caught.
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Code review by qodo was updated up to the latest commit 0cc5918 |
This was referenced Sep 26, 2026
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Summary
Audit P1-1: login lockout DoS, fixed under the owner's A + B policy (ADR-0145). Two properties have to hold together: no third party can lock an account out, and distributed password guessing is bounded.
The bug:
POST /v1/auth/logincharged a per-handle bucket (5 per 15 minutes) on every attempt, before checking the password. Anyone who knew a handle could keep its owner out; reproduced onmain.POST /v1/auth/webauthn/login/optionshad the same flaw for challenge requests.Design
login:iplogin:handle-iplogin:handleviaRateLimiter.tallyCode rules:
401withdetails.reason: step_up_required. The code statements always run, with a decoy id for unknown handles.Accounts:
403withdetails.reason: email_unverified.POST /v1/auth/email/verification/resendre-sends the link without a session, by handle or email. It always answers202, sends only to an existing unverified address, keeps the 10-minute per-account cooldown, and is limited per IP only; a per-handle bucket would be a lockout lever. This is how an unverified owner recovers while their handle is in step-up, where answeringemail_unverifiedwould tell a guesser the password was right. The web form has a matching "Resend verification email" control.ErrorCodestays closed; reasons travel indetails.reason.Storage: migration
0037adds the token kind and an attempt counter.0038builds the one-live-code index withCREATE UNIQUE INDEX CONCURRENTLY, following the online-index convention.Web: registration refuses a blank email before sending. The sign-in form shows a code field only after a step-up answer.
e2e harness: records outgoing email behind
GET /e2e/outbox, a test-only route; the harness is not part of any production image.Limits (ADR-0145)
Tests
login-step-up.test.ts,login-lockout.test.ts):login-step-up.integration.test.ts,pg-security.integration.test.ts):tallyrace across two limitersreservereturned, and tallies once under thelogin:handle:key.Local results (0 skipped throughout):
npm run lint, ADR-claims, topology and observability checks: cleanThe
auth-responsivelayout assertions that compare two boxes read one after the other (sameRow) are intermittently flaky onmaintoo: 2 in 36 runs with main's markup, the same rate as with this branch. They pass on retry.Scope
API authentication and rate limiting, persistence identity tokens, the web sign-in and registration form, the e2e harness, and tests, plus the append-only
docs/PROJECT_STATE.mdIncrement 67 (after #62's 66), ADR-0145, and a one-line current-state correction indocs/FEATURE_PARITY_AUDIT.md. Mergedmain(#62) normally, with no rebase or force push.Test plan