Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's Security → Report a vulnerability form on this repository rather than in a public issue. Include the commit or version, a reproduction, and the impact you believe it has. You will get an acknowledgement, and a fix or a written assessment, as fast as a small project can manage.
What the project does continuously, enforced by required CI on every change:
unsafeis confined and justified. Allocator/FFI internals only (oxidelake-memory,oxidelake-device, the io_uring worker inoxidelake-storage); every block carries a// SAFETY:comment stating the invariant it relies on (clippy.tomlrequires it), every raw resource is owned by an RAII type, andunsafe_op_in_unsafe_fnis denied.oxidelake-coreis#![forbid(unsafe_code)].- No panics in library code.
unwrap,expect,todo!andunimplemented!are denied by the workspace lints; unimplemented paths returnEngineError::Unsupported. A plan payload from the network cannot drive the predicate evaluators arbitrarily deep (MAX_PREDICATE_LEAVES). - Untrusted input is validated before it becomes a node. The plan codec
checks magic, version, column indices, types and dimensions; generated SQL
quotes every identifier; a model path given to
predictmust be a constant, and the layer shapes in the file it names must fit the tensor data the file holds before anything is allocated (#96). A Parquet file's footer is checked against the file before any read is sized by it, so a corrupt or hostile file is anEngineError::Formatrather than a panic or an allocation of whatever the footer declares (ParquetScanGuard; what it does not cover is inSTATUS.md). An Arrow IPC spill or cache file is checked against its own length before arrow-ipc decodes it, so a corrupt one is an error, not a panic or an allocation the file cannot back (#110). - Dependency policy (
denyjob): RUSTSEC advisories, a license allow-list, banned crates and crates.io-only sources on every PR; weekly grouped Dependabot updates that leave the DataFusion/Ballista chain's majors alone. Every accepted advisory indeny.tomlcarries a written reason. - Workflow security (
zizmorjob at--persona=pedantic): every GitHub Action pinned to a full commit SHA, checkouts that do not persist credentials, a read-only workflow token by default. Accepted findings are in.github/zizmor.yml. - Build caches are dependency-only and never restored for a release.
Three jobs use
Swatinem/rust-cachewithcache-bin: falseandcache-workspace-crates: false, so no workspace crate and no tool binary is ever served from a cache; what returns is third-party dependency builds keyed by the lockfile. Every such step is guarded bygithub.workflow == 'CI' && !inputs.clean, so aworkflow_callfromrelease.ymlrestores nothing and builds from scratch — a published artifact never comes from a cache (ADR-0017, measured in docs/ci-cache-measurement.md). - Protected history.
maintakes only squash-merged pull requests withrequired-greenandcommit-policygreen — direct pushes are rejected, the maintainer's included.v*tags can only be created by an admin, and releases publish through crates.io Trusted Publishing from areleaseenvironment that deploys fromv*tags alone. - GPU correctness is asserted, not assumed. Every device operator is conformance-tested against stock DataFusion, and the Metal suite asserts device execution through transfer counters so a silent CPU fallback cannot pass as a GPU result.
Each is a dependency advisory that cannot be fixed inside the pinned
DataFusion/Ballista chain, accepted with a written reason in deny.toml and
re-examined at every chain bump. None is silent: they are listed here, in
deny.toml, and in STATUS.md.
- quick-xml (RUSTSEC-2026-0194/0195) — reached only by
object_store's cloud backends, which OxideLake never registers. - paste (RUSTSEC-2024-0436) — a compile-time proc-macro dependency of the
metalcrate, which oxmera pulls on macOS under thepredictfeature (arrow-flight moved topasteyin 59); no runtime code. - chrono, chrono-tz and humantime (RUSTSEC-2026-0543, -0555,
-0542) — "unmaintained" notices, not vulnerabilities, with no maintained
release to move to. chrono and chrono-tz are arrow 59's date/time and
timezone support, under every DataFusion and Ballista crate; humantime is
object_store0.13's duration parsing.
Only the main branch (and the most recent tagged release, if any) receives
security fixes.
OxideLake is an analytical engine intended to run on infrastructure you control. Its security boundary is the machine or private network it runs on, not the query interface.
-
Cluster mode has no authentication or transport encryption yet, so the network is the boundary, and the binaries hold it.
oxide-schedulerandoxide-workerspeak plain gRPC and Arrow Flight and will execute any plan a connected client submits, including reading any file the worker process can read. Both bind to127.0.0.1by default, accept a private address, and refuse a public one, or every address at once, unless--allow-insecure-bindis given (#30).Production deployments. The cluster's ports (the scheduler's one port for gRPC, REST and probes, each worker's Flight and gRPC ports, and any
--metrics-port) have no authentication and no encryption: whoever can connect can run queries, and a query can read any file a worker can read. Keep them on a network that only the cluster's own hosts and trusted clients can reach, such as a private subnet or a VPN, behind a firewall.oxide-schedulerandoxide-workerrefuse to listen on a public address, or on every address (0.0.0.0,::), unless--allow-insecure-bindsays that something else, such as that firewall, already decides who can connect, and they log a warning whenever they listen beyond loopback. TLS and authentication in OxideLake itself are tracked in #30. -
A lost worker fails its queries rather than risk wrong rows (#148). Ballista 55's recovery from a lost worker can return duplicated rows with exit 0 (fixed upstream by apache/datafusion-ballista#2677, unreleased), so
oxide-schedulerfails a query that held output on a worker it loses, and--stage-max-failuresdefaults to 1. Raising that limit turns Ballista's stage retries, and the bug, back on. -
Workers trust their scheduler. Physical plans arrive over the network and are decoded by
OxidePhysicalCodec. Payloads are validated (magic, version, column indices, types, dimensions, a cap on predicate size) so a malformed payload yields an error rather than a panic, but a malicious scheduler is outside the threat model: it can already run arbitrary SQL. -
A scheduler's build check is not authentication.
oxide-schedulerrefuses a worker whose plan fingerprint differs from its own, so a mismatched deployment fails when the worker registers rather than in a query. The worker declares that fingerprint itself (in its executor id), so the check stops accidents, not an attacker who can reach the port. -
The
oxideCLI reads any Parquet path you give it with your privileges; identifiers you pass (--table NAME=PATH) are quoted before they are used in generated SQL. -
GPU kernels bounds-check every global access; kernel sources are compiled from strings embedded in the binary at build time, never from user input.
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Unsafe code is confined to allocator and FFI internals and every block documents its invariant (
// SAFETY:);oxidelake-coreis#![forbid(unsafe_code)].
cargo deny check runs in CI against the RustSec advisory database. Advisories
that cannot be fixed by an upgrade are ignored only with a written reason in
deny.toml explaining why the affected code path is unreachable in OxideLake;
each ignore is revisited whenever the DataFusion/Ballista chain moves.